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In the case of Bellamy v. Johnsonl the Supreme Court
voided an annexation proceeding by which the Town of Ocean
Drive Beach in Horry County sought to enlarge its corporate
limits, on the ground that the ballot used in the election con-
tained a misleading statement held by the Court to have been
unfairly calculated to induce favorable votes. The ballot used
in the election contained the following stipulation:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the
Town of Ocean Drive Beach and the above desribed ter-
ritory that if the above described territory is included
in the Town of Ocean Drive Beach that the Town of
Ocean Drive Beach shall pass an Ordinance exempting
all parcels of undeveloped real estate in excess of ten
(10) acres owned by a person or persons from taxation
until such property is developed or divided into lots.
The record indicates that the stipulation probably resulted
from a special act relating to Ocean Drive Beach, which per-
mitted that municipality to exempt from municipal taxation,
any property, the exemption of which was not prohibited by
the Constitution of this State.
The Court held that the stipulation constituted a misrepre-
sentation and since it could have easily induced favorable
votes by persons residing in the area to be annexed, it voided
the election. But the opinion rendered in this case did not pass
upon the important question raised by the appellent that the
stipulation was void because it was unconstitutional. The
Court simply saw fit to classify the stipulation as an empty
promise, and therefore void; but since the South Carolina
Statute, viz., Section 47-13, specifically authorizes the annex-
ing corporation and the adjacent territory "to stipulate and
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agree upon terms of consolidation and such stipulations shall
become a binding contract upon the city or town when en-
larged... ," any stipulation that is not void for some specific
reason would constitute a contract and would be enforceable.
Therefore, to destroy the stipulation, it is necessary to pass
upon the validity of the stipulation, and, in other words, to
pass upon its constitutionality.
The lower court had likewise avoided the question, deeming
it unnecessary and holding that even if the stipulation was un-
constitutional, it would not cause an annexation, otherwise
valid, to fail. No citation of authority supported this remark-
able conclusion.
The result of the Supreme Court's decision in this case is,
without doubt, correct because the stipulation was in fact in-
valid. But the invalidity of the stipulation does not rest upon
its being "an empty promise," which influenced the votes of
those living in the area to be annexed. For in order to avoid
misrepresentation, the Statute requires the stipulations to be
placed upon the ballot. Thus, it is intended that they influence
votes. Therefore, since stipulations are authorized by the Sta-
tute, they can mislead only when they are incomprehensible
or invalid. The stipulation here is capable of being under-
stood. Thus, in order to be invalid, the stipulation here must
violate some Constitutional provision.
In this case the stipulation was invalid because it is in di-
rect conflict with the provisions of Section 1, Article X and
Section 6 of Article VIII, both of which require uniformity
of taxation. Furthermore, the Statute authorizing the tax ex-
emption which formed the basis of the stipulation, is in itself
invalid as special legislation violative of both Section I of
Article VIII and Section 34 of Article III. Therefore, since it
was invalid, it was misleading and "an empty promise."
The Supreme Court stated that it did not pass upon these
Constitutional questions because of its established policy of
avoiding decisions relating to the constitutionality of laws
wherever it was possible. Such a principle is, of course, a cor-
rect one, but when the constitutionality, or lack of constitu-
tionality, is essential to the decision, a ruling by the Court is
required. Since in this case the stipulation was misleading be-
cause it was invalid and since further, the invalidity rests
solely upon its unconstitutionality, the Constitutional questions
should have been considered.
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Necessity to Pursue Administrative Remedies Granted
by Ordinances
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in 1955, in the
case of Richards v. City of Columbia,2 the City of Spartan-
burg adopted a Sub-Standard Housing Rehabilitation Ordi-
nance similar to the Columbia Ordinance upheld by the Su-
preme Court's 3-2 decision in the Richards case, with the om-
mission of the portion held unconstitutional for vagueness.
The case of DePass v. City of Spartanburg3 represents a
challenge on the part of the property owner in Spartanburg
to the validity of administrative orders issued pursuant to the
Spartanburg Ordinance. The question for decision by the
Supreme Court arose upon a decree sustaining a demurrer to
a complaint in which the plaintiff had sought a holding that an
Order, issued by Municipal Officials pursuant to the Ordi-
nance, had the effect of depriving the plaintiff of her prop-
erty without process of law. The statement of facts indicated
that the enforcement of the Ordinance had been the subject
of a serious dispute between the plaintiff and the municipal
officials of Spartanburg. It appears that the plaintiff owns
twenty-four rental units in Spartanburg, against most of
which enforcement efforts (pursuant to the Ordinance) had
been directed. The complaint alleged unnecessary and unrea-
sonable inspections of those properties, an attitude of hostility
on the part of those who sought to enforce the Ordinance and
the failure of the City to provide certain services required of
it by the Ordinance itself. The demurrer was upheld upon the
ground that a Court of Equity would not take jurisdiction of
the controversy until the plaintiff had exhausted all of the
administrative remedies provided by the Ordinance. The Court
also held that the contention that the City could not enforce
the Ordinance until it had provided street paving and other
improvements was "untenable because in any view it is not
bound to do so in advance of plaintiff's rehabilitation of her
substandard houses." A review of the Ordinance does not
seem to condition enforcement upon performance by the City.
The Ordinance makes the City responsible for "performing all
services required by this Ordinance or any other Ordinance
or policies of the City providing for city service to dwellings."
2. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E. 2d 683 (1955).
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No specific obligation to pave the streets appears. Had the
City entered into a specific obligation involving the expendi-
ture of tax moneys at some future date, it is possible that
such an obligation would constitute the incurring of bonded
debt without an observance of the constitutional provisions
relating thereto. This interesting and serious question does
not appear to have been presented to the Court. It is likely
that the Ordinance would be construed to mean that the City
must - to the extent that tax moneys were available - render
the contemplated services. An obligation of this sort would
be valid and the City would be obligated to expend available
moneys in such way that it provided service wherever possi-
ble. Flagrant discrimination against sections of the City
could probably be enjoined.
The acceptance by the Court of the validity of this Ordi-
nance without comment has significance. It is to be remem-
bered that the 3-2 decision in the Richards case found the four
members of the Court, (as now constituted), who had partici-
pated in the Richards decision, evenly divided. Justice Moss
was not on that occasion a member of the Supreme Court, and
it was the concurrence of Circuit Judge Lewis, sitting in place
of then Chief Justice Baker, that had sustained the Columbia
Ordinance. Justices Oxner and Legge had dissented from the
majority opinion in the Richards case. Hence, the failure of
these two Justices to comment on the validity of the Ordinance
together with the absence of comment by Justice Moss, indi-
cates that the Court as now constituted, regarded the Richards
case as stare decisis.
It is to be hoped that this is true, for the importance of
such Ordinances to the governing bodies of the larger munici-
palities in attempts to curtail the constant expansion of slum
areas, was commented upon in an earlier review.4 Basically,
there is nothing harsh about this type of Ordinance. Those
who own property in municipalities must recognize that over-
crowded conditions frequently bring about harmful results.
Illustrative, are the terrible slum areas of the larger metro-
politan cities of the country which have spawned violence
and contempt of law. While good living conditions are no
guarantee that crime and juvenile delinquency will not flour-
ish, nevertheless, good living conditions must be regarded as
4. 9 S.C.L.Q. 19 (1956).
1959]
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a crime deterrent. The establishment of the medieval city re-
quired a surrender of certain feudal rights, but those who
sought the safety afforded by the medieval municipality, gave
up those rights. Similarly, one who acquires property in any
municipality must be deemed to have given his consent to
proper police regulation which is now generally recognized
to permit the adoption and enforcement of Ordinances such
as that adopted by Spartanburg designed to eliminate build-
ings unfit for human habitation. Many factors enter into
the present flight to suburban living. But at least one factor
is the failure of our cities to provide attractive residential
areas in the older parts. If our cities are to survive, they
must improve living conditions therein. Otherwise, they may
well become mere jungles where only the criminal element
will find haven.
Another point of significance in the present holding is
that it reaffirms a principle of procedure that will inevitably
become important when South Carolina is confronted with
class actions in integration litigation. It must not be forgotten
that the North Carolina statute prescribing in detail the ad-
ministrative procedure to be followed by all who would seek
enrollment in a public school other than the public school to
which they had been assigned, was upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a case in which certiorari
was denied.6 It will be comforting to those who may here-
after be forced to rely on just such a statute, to be able to
point to a solid precedent in a case not involving segregation.
For this reason too, the decision here assumes real importance.
Liability of Municipal Corporations for Defective
Operation of Sanitary Sewer System
In the case of Collins v. City of Greenville,6 the plaintiff
sought to recover for damages sustained by his property when
a sanitary sewer line in the City of Greenville, constituting a
part of the publicly owned and operated sewage disposal sys-
tem, clogged, causing sewage to back up and overflow the
commodes in buldings owned by the plaintiff, with the result
that hardwood floors and carpets in those buildings were
ruined.
5. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F. 2d 724, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 981, 1 L. Ed.
2d 664, 77 S. Ct. 665 (1957).
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The lower court had overruled a demurrer interposed upon
the ground that the complaint did not set forth a cause of
action, resting its decision on the reasoning that action or
inaction by the City of Greenville in permitting the sewage
line to clog and to overflow, constituted a taking of private
property for public use without compensation, which gave rise
to an action for damages as a consequence of that taking. The
relatively recent case of Webb v. Greenville County,7 which
was reviewed in 10 S. C. Law Quarterly, Page 24, holds that
under Section 17 of Article I of our Constitution, there is no
distinction between the taking of property and the damaging
of it, when the damage results as a consequence of some public
project. This section of the Constitution has been held to be
self-executing.
On appeal in the Collins case the Supreme Court reversed,
pointing out that the kind of taking contemplated by Section
17 of Article I was taking (or damaging) which resulted
from a situation basically permanent in nature. The Court
said that this rule was not to be construed as a method by
which to enlarge the waiver of sovereign immunity, relaxed
only by the statute permitting suits for damages resulting
from defects in streets.8 The Court, quoting with approval
from its earlier holding in the case of Gasque v. The Town of
Conway,9 said:
. . . Ordinarily the constitutional provision under con-
sideration contemplates compensation for a 'taking' or
for damage which is permanent or presumably of a per-
manent nature, and growing out of a positive act or ag-
gressive step. It was never intended to furnish a cause
of action for every error of judgment committed or
wrongful act perpetrated by a town council.
And to justify its conclusion, the Court said that the com-
plaint in this case revealed that there was a single isolated,
instance (viz., the clogging of the sewer) from which resulted
the damage to the plaintiff. It held that in this case there was
no degree of permanent taking in the constitutional sense,
nor was there continuity over a period of time. The de-
cision is eminently sound, and the discussion timely, because
in view of the sweeping nature of statements made in some
7. 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E. 2d 688 (1956).
8. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 47-70, As Amended.
9. 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E. 2d 871 (1939).
1959]
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tf the earlier cases, the distinction made here should be em-
phasized by the Court. Indeed, the holding here clears the at-
mosphere.
As the result of its holding on this question, it became
necessary for the Supreme Court to pass upon the second
theory of recovery set out in the plaintiff's complaint. This
was predicated upon the theory that the sewer was a part of
the street, and that it was because of the mismanagement of
the sewer that the damage resulted. For this reason, argued
the plaintiff, Code Section 47-70 applied, and the case here
was to be considered as a suit for damages arising from a de-
fect in streets. Our Court has held-and quite properly so-
that a storm sewer is a part of a street,10 but clearly, a sani-
tary sewer, designed to collect and dispose of sewage, is some-
thing separate and distinct from the street.
Noting that earlier decisions had held that in order to sus-
tain an action under this statute, the defect or mismanage-
ment of the street had to relate to the maintenance of the
street in relation to its use for safe travel, the Court quickly
disposed of this contention of the plaintiff.
Limitation of Actions Resulting from Damages Which
Constitute a "Constitutional" Taking by Reason of Section
17, Article I of the State Constitution
The South Carolina doctrine of absolute liability for dam-
age to private property sustained as a consequence of a pub-
lic use and the effect of the six-year statute of limitations
upon such causes of action was reviewed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in disposing of the claim of Hilton for
damages to his land by reason of the operation of the Wateree
Dam by the Duke Power Company in a case brought by
Hilton against that Company." Wateree Dam had been con-
structed in 1919 by the Wateree Power Company. It was ori-
ginally built to have 212 feet above sea level. In 1925 the dam
was raised to 218 feet above sea level, and at all times since
then the impounded waters have been maintained at that
level. The Duke Power Company acquired the dam in 1927.
The case here involved four tracts of land and bristled with
questions, but those questions arising as a consequence of
10. Marshall v. Rose, 213 S.C. 428, 49 S.E. 2d 720 (1948).
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earlier condemnations and releases are not within the scope
of this review.
In its review of the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals
found that the evidence presented to the jury would sustain
the jury finding that the actual injury had occurred within
the six-year period of limitation, notwithstanding that the in-
itial circumstances causing that injury had occurred long
before. Since this last statement could easily pass as an over-
simplification, it will be helpful to the lawyer interested in
this question to refer to Judge Sobeloff's opinion, since it
presents the South Carolina rule in language of unusual
clarity.
The effect of the statute of limitations and the extent
to which it is applicable depend upon the nature of the
cause of action and the time when it accrues. The South
Carolina rule is that there is a taking within the mean-
ing of the constitution, and consequently an accrual of
a right of action, when 'neighboring real estate, belong-
ing to a private owner, is actually invaded by superin-
duced additions of water, earth, sand or other material
A neighboring landowner, however, acquires
no rights against the owner of the dam and limitations
do not begin to run until an actual injury occurs ....
Once some actual injury is suffered, however, if the
cause is permanent, non-negligent, and not subject to
abatement, a single right of action accrues, in which the
landowner must seek recovery for both past and future
damages ....
But the right to future damages, and the corresponding
obligation to seek them in a single suit, are not automatic.
The answer depends upon whether the 'permanency and
extent' of the prospective injuries are, or should be,
known to the landowner .... The rule has twin objectives.
The first is to protect circumstances where a single ac-
tion could fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. The
other, equally important, is to avoid the injustice to plain-
tiffs of having limitations begin to run against them be-
fore their right to sue has matured.
If the existing injury must necessarily continue or in-
crease, and if the amount of the damage can be deter-
mined or estimated, the cause of action as to future dam-
age accrues at once .... Whether the prospective injury
19591
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is subject to reasonable estimation may involve consider-
ation of complex factual data, and the question is or-
dinarily a proper one for the jury.
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that as to one of
the four tracts of land involved, evidence had been adduced
that actual damage had begun only within the six-year limi-
tation period and that the award for damages therefor was
proper.
The petition for rehearing filed by Duke Power Company
was denied. 12 It was therein contended that:
[TIhe single cause of action which accrues when the
slightest injury is occasioned includes any and all possible
future injury, whether reasonably foreseeable or not.
The Court of Appeals said that this was not a correct view
of the law on this question as applied in South Carolina. In
so ruling it stood by its previously stated conclusion that:
[T] he right to future damages and the corresponding ob-
ligation to seek them in a single suit are not automatic.
The answer depends upon. . . 'the permanency and ex-
tent' to which [they] are or should be known.
Liability of Municipal Corporation for Damages Arising
From Defect in Street Under Improvement for
Municipality by County
The case here has an interesting economic aspect. It points
up the extent to which political subdivisions of the State re-
ceive aid from the State, particularly the extent to which the
State Highway Department assists incorporated cities and
towns in the State in the construction and maintenance of
streets and thoroughfares within the incorporated limits of
such towns. The situation in South Carolina today is far dif-
ferent than it was a few decades ago. Formerly, the only im-
proved streets and thoroughfares lay within the corporate
limits of municipalities, and the desire to obtain proper
streets was one of the impelling forces which brought about
municipal incorporations and municipal annexations. But to-
day in South Carolina nearly all of the important streets in
all municipalities are maintained by the State Highway De-
partment. The authorization for this stems from various legis-
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lative enactments. Little, if any, new construction work is
done by the municipalities themselves.
In the case here, a street in the City of Camden was being
improved by Kershaw County pursuant to a provision of the
Code permitting the Highway Department to contract with the
counties themselves for the construction and improvement of
"farm-to-market" roads. The term "farm-to-market" is a
flexible one, for the street in the City of Camden here in-
Volved, was being improved under the "farm-to-market" road
program and the work was being done by the County as the
contractor of the State Highway Department. The plaintiff,
who suffered an injury in the street allegedly by reason of a
defect caused by the construction, brought suit against the
City, the County and the State Highway Department. The
trial court ruled that under Code Section 33-174, the munici-
pality was liable and that no recovery was to be had against
the Highway Department or against its contractor. On appeal,
the municipality did not seek to hold the Highway Depart-
ment liable, but contended that the County as a contractor
was responsible for the damages suffered during the con-
struction period. The Court held that the legislative enact-
ment permitting counties to assume work ordinarily done by
independent contractors did not make them a contractor with-
in the ordinary sense of the word. The Court held that the
County was a branch, or agency, of State Government and as
such, was shielded by the sovereign immunity of the State. No
startling-principle of law is involved here.
Right of Recoupment Against the Sovereign
The case of Mullins Hospital v. Squires Administrator'
presents an extremely interesting development in the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. The case involved an attempt by Mul-
lins Hospital, which is a public hospital established pursuant
to legislative enactment, 14 to recover against the defendant
for hospitalization afforded the defendant's decedent over a
period of nearly two years. By way of defense, her adminis-
trator alleged that Victoria Squires had been a deaf mute and,
prior to her entry to the hospital, had sustained a fracture
of her hip, which should have been discovered by the hospital
13. 233 S.C. 186, 104 S.E. 2d 161 (1958).
14. 33 STATUTES, p. 758 (1905).
.1959]
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had any proper routine physical examination been made, and
that through the negligence of the hospital in failing to dis-
cover the fracture, her hospitalization was vastly prolonged.
The defendant also attempted to assert a counterclaim in tort
for damages sustained by Victoria Squires as a result of the
negligence of the hospital. Thus presented for consideration
in this case is:
1. The question of tort liability of a public hospital en-
gaged in a field which might be said to be proprietary
in nature as distinguished from governmental; and
2. The right of recoupment against a claim of the govern-
mental agency, notwithstanding that the basic right to
sue the governmental agency might be denied.
The Court held that without doubt, the hospital was operated
by a political subdivision of the State, and that the sovereign
immunity from actions based upon negligence in the perform-
ance of governmental functions could be availed of by the po-
litical subdivision. It noted once again, that in South Carolina
all functions exercised by political subdivisions are considered
public and governmental in nature. The distinction, elsewhere
made between functions deemed proprietary and functions
deemed governmental, has no application in South Carolina.
Furthermore, noted the Court, the sovereign immunity ex-
tends generally to all governmental agencies, and without
a statute permitting suits in tort against governmental units,
suits therefore cannot be maintained. On this basis, it denied
the right of the administrator to recover for damages on its
counterclaim.
Notwithstanding, however, it permitted the administrator
to plead the defense of recoupment. The Court noted:
Recoupment, unlike counterclaim, may result only in
the reduction of the plaintiff's claim, and not in affirm-
ative money judgment for any excess over that claim.
Unlike set-off, it must grow out of the identical trans-
action that gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action.
'Recoupment, therefore, is the right of the defendant
to cut down or diminish the claim of the plaintiff in con-
sequence of his failure to comply with some provision of
the contract sought to be enforced, or because he has
violated some duty imposed upon him by law in the mak-




Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
deficiency which will justify the reduction of the plain-
tiff's claim must arise out of the same transaction, and
not out of a different transaction.'
It may be of interest to note that a similar question is in-
volved in the protracted, though not yet concluded, admiralty
litigation relating to the collision damage to the Ashley River
Bridge when struck by the tank steamer, Fort Fetterman, on
October 1955.15 In that admiralty cause, following the High-
way Department's libel of the vessel, the ship counterclaimed
for damages done to it, notwithstanding that there was no
statute permitting such a counterclaim. By motion made to
the District Court, the State sought a dismissal of the counter-
claim on the grounds that the counterclaim was not consented
to by statute, but the State agreed in argument that the claim
might be asserted by way of recoupment.1 6 The District
Court, (A. H. Williams, U. S. District Judge), in an unre-
ported decision, denied the motion to dismiss, holding that
a Court of Admiralty was not interdicted by the Eleventh
Amendment, and could consider the counterclaim and award
damages against the State without its permission, irrespective
of whether or not the State sustained its own libel. The order
refusing the motion to dismiss was clearly interlocutory in
nature. Notwithstanding, because of the serious and adverse
long range effect that might result from an unchallenged
holding on so important an aspect of States rights, an appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and
orally argued as a petition for a writ of prohibition to pro-
hibit the District Court from considering the counterclaim. 17
To support its position, the State cited State v. Corbin and
15. South Carolina Highway Department v. Charles Kurz and Com-
pany, 236 F. 2d 221 (1956).
148 F. Supp. 620 (1956).
242 F. 2d 799 (1957).
355 U.S. 826 (1957).
155 F. Supp. 359 (1957).
261 F. 2d 563 (1958).
268 F. 2d 27 (1959).
16. The State argued that under the Eleventh Amendment to U. S.
Constitution its consent through Statutory Enactment was in-
dispensable to the right to counterclaim.
17. The U. S. Courts of Appeals are denied the right to review
interlocutory decrees which do not finally determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties. 28 USCA 1292 (3). However, not-
withstanding, Federal Appellate Courts have, on occasion, through
the consideration of applications for mandamus and prohibition,
indirectly effected a review of orders purely interlocutory in na-
ture. Compare in re State of New York, et al., 256 U. S. 490, 65
L. Ed. 1057, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921).
1959]
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Stone,1 8 referred to in Justice Legge's opinion to the effect
that the State's immunity to suit in tort is not removed merely
by reason of the fact that the State becomes a plaintiff. The
State also relied upon a brief opinion by Judge Simonton in
the case of Port Royal and Augusta Railway Company v. The
State of South Carolina,19 in which Judge Simonton, in an
equity case, had permitted recoupment against the State while
recognizing that a counterclaim could not lie unless the State
had consented to be sued.
The Court of Appeals, after an unusually lengthy oral ar-
gument, dismissed the appeal, holding that the order below
was clearly interlocutory and that the State's rights would be
preserved following a determination of the merits of the case.
Thus has the State, so far, partially destroyed Judge Wil-
liams' order as an important precedent, for a ruling by the
Court of Appeals on the correctness of his order has been re-
served. Since the State has so far been successful in assert-
ing its claim, it is unlikely that this litigation will result in
a ruling on the part of the United States Courts as to whether
the counterclaim could have been sustained, even though the
State should fail in its efforts to uphold its claim for dam-
ages. But even without Judge Legge's opinion, the State had
conceded that while no counterclaim could be allowed, recoup-
ment was in order. If the question ever gets to the United
States Supreme Court the decision in this case will be further
authority to support the State's motion to dismiss.
Power of County Boards of Education to Subdivide
Existing School Districts
The dispute here arose as a consequence of action taken by
the County Board of Education of Marion County in dividing
what had been School District No. 3 into two separate School
Districts. School District No. 3 was itself a consolidation
which had occurred following the enactment of the School
Law of 1951.20 The question involved was extremely narrow
and related merely to the construction of the applicable legis-
lation.2 ' It was there provided that:
18. 16 S.C. 533 (181).
19. 60 Fed. 552 (1894).
20. 47 STATUTES p. 546, 662 (1932).
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"Unless otherwise expressly provided, the school districts
of the various counties shall not be altered or divided
except:
"(1) By act of the General Assembly relating one or
more counties; or
"(2) By authorization of the county boards of education
under the following conditions:
"(a) With the written approval of the Senator and the
entire house legislative delegation from the county in-
volved;
"(b) Upon a written petition, signed by at least four
fifths of the qualified electors embraced within the limits
of each of the school districts involved,.., or
"(c) ... if such consolidation be approved favorably by
a majority of the qualified electors of each of the school
districts.. ."
The contention was made that in order to alter the boun-
daries of the consolidated School District it was necessary
that a compliance be effected with Subparagraphs (a) and
(b) above quoted. The Court held that a compliance with (a)
alone was sufficient.
For a somewhat parallel situation relating to the power of
the State Educational Finance Commission to alter the lines
of the School Districts located in more than one county, ref-
erence should be had to the case of Powers v. State Educa-
tional Finance Commission.22 The Powers case, incidentally,
is an important decision in the field of public education in
South Carolina for it specifically holds that no constitutional
barrier is imposed by Section 5 of Article XI as now written
to the creation of a School District constituted of parts of
more than one County.
22. 222 S.C. 433, 73 S.E. 2d 456 (1952).
1959]
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